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MODELS THAT REFLECT THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
IN A COMMAND AND CONTROL CONTEXT
D. P. Gaver
1. Introduction
The importance of information in military decision making
is widely recognized, and the existence of many sophisticated
intelligence-gathering and processing systems is a consequence
of this recognition. However, there now seem to be few analyti-
cal studies that attempt to explicitly relate information to
ultimate military success. In this report an attempt is made to
investigate some simple conflict situations, the outcomes of which
are likely to be strongly influenced by the information possessed
by the opponents. The situations selected are simple enough to
be analyzed mathematically, at least in a preliminary way, but
no attempt is made to thoroughly explore all of their ramifica-
tions, especially in mathematical directions. All of the formu-
lations suggested and explored are quite tentative and incomplete;
interesting refinements and realistic modifications will suggest
themselves to some readers.
One use for models of the type discussed here is to enhance
the efficiency, realism, or validity of complex conflict simula-
tions and wargames. At present, combat models such as Lanchester's
equations are used in a modular fashion in some wargames to decide
isolated confrontation outcomes. The Air Force TAC WARRIOR pro-
vides an example. Somewhat different models, such as the ones
described here, can serve such a purpose. Another use is to
facilitate quick and simple exploration of tradeoffs between
asset types. Questions of the following types may be tentatively
addressed: is increased investment likely to be more profitably
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spent on weapons or on command, control, and communications (C )
systems? Likewise, tactical options may be investigated: should
attacks be directed at weaponry or at command centers? Answers
to such questions, even based on oversimplifications, should be
of help in suggesting improved defensive and offensive tactics.
If necessary, deeper probing by more elaborate wargaming can be
employed for backup confirmation. The kinds of models proposed
here are tentative and suggestive, and have no definitive
pretensions.
2. Combat With and Without Coordination
2.1. The Problem Area
The purpose of this section is to suggest some extremely
simple models of combat that represent the effects of coordina-
tion or information sharing . Our approach will first be to
study the influence of lack of coordination upon the attrition
power of one force against another, and then to compare this
with the increased attrition power obtained under coordination
—
the latter being made possible by the information flow character-
3istic of a C system.
2.2. Model 1: Static Salvo Interchange Formulation
Suppose a group of B forces confront one of R (we
use the symbols B and R variously to label the forces, or
to refer to a generic member of the respective forces, or to
enumerate the initial force sizes; the context tells the tale).
Suppose B wishes to attack R, and does so without coordina-
tion , i.e. each B picks a member of R at random and fires at
it once , independently of the behavior of the other B's. For
the moment assume that all R's are equally likely to receive
fire from a single B. Also assume that the kill probability
of B against R is unity; this assumption is extreme but
convenient and somewhat informative, and will later be relaxed.
Obviously the lack of coordination or information transfer
among B's leads to inefficiency: some R's will receive two
or more of B's shots and experience overkill; others
may receive none, surviving by chance neglect. As a measure of
the effectiveness of such fire on the part of B, calculate
2.3. The Expected Number of R' s Hit
This is a classical "occupancy problem" (see Feller [1966])
that can be solved by use of indicator functions. If XR is the
random variable denoting the number of Rs hit by B missiles














if jth R is hit by B fire
otherwise.
Now by the linearity of the expectation operator,
R
E[X ] = I EU.] . (2.2)R j=l 3
Since each indicator has the same marginal distribution, we need
only calculate the probability of at least one hit on j (recall
that kill probability is temporarily one) : the probability that
all B shots are directed elsewhere is [(R-l)/R] and so
i
B




PUj-1} = 1-PU .=0} = 1- (1-|) ,
and, therefore, it follows that the expected number of R's hit




= R i-(i-f) (2.4)
Calculation of the variance, and the entire distribution is also
manageable and only a little more complicated. Under certain
conditions the distribution of the latter XR , properly normal-
ized will approach the normal or Gaussian form (see Sevastyanov
and Christyakov [1978]).
It is also possible to derive a formula for the situation
in which the probability of a B hitting each R depends upon
which R is fired upon. That is, suppose each B picks the
jth R with probability r.. Then the probability that no B
picks the jth R is (1-r.) , and, following the earlier
pattern,
R b
E[Xp ] = I [1- (l-r.)
a
] . (2.5)R j=l 3
It is even possible to calculate the expected number of R's hit
if the probability that the ith B picks the jth R independ-
ently is r.
.
; note that such differences may be caused by
different intervisibilities, possibly reflecting terrain effects,
In this case the probability that the jth R is not picked is
B
(1-r .) (1-r-.)... (l-r_.) = n (1-r..)
JO z 3 &3
j_= i ^3
and, adding up over the j R's, we find that
R B
E[X_] = I [1- n (1-r. .)] (2.6)
1=1 i=l J
For the moment we stick with the simple model (2.4) for discussion,
It is instructive to look at the ratio
R
= Expected fraction of R*s hit
as the latter depends upon the initial ratio of B to







-> 1 - e
-3 (2.7)
if B (and R) become large. This is very simple and handy,
and leads to an immediate assessment of the effect of lack of
coordination or information transfer, for by our assumptions
if B (= 3R in number) fires in a coordinated fashion at R,
i.e. each B has only one R target, then E[X_] = 3R, pro-
vided 3 5 1(B5R), while E[X_] = R if 3 > 1 (B>R) . If we
rv.
assess the advantage of coordination by A (3), then in the












5 3 5 1
3 > 1
(2.8)
Here is a sketchy numerical table to illustrate the gain from














A graph appears below
Figure 1.
In this first simple model coordination pays off most when the
forces are about equally numerous: if B is much smaller than
R then the chances of random overlap are small, and so coordina-
tion is not required, while if B greatly outnumbers R coor-
dination will again not be required to assure coverage. Under
the latter conditions there is extensive overkill, and some B
forces can be usefully employed elsewhere.
2.4. The Expected Number of B's Hit
The above model merely calculates the effect of a B action
against R. If we assume that R fires simultaneously at B then




= B 1-fl-feB- (2.9)
The kill probability is still assumed to be unity in this model.
2.5. The Expected Number of R's Killed in a Single
Engagement , Both Without, and With, Coordination
Here is a generalization of the earlier models to explicitly
account for (i) the less-than-unit kill probability of R by B,
denoted by PRB / and (ii) the rate of fire of B, denoted by
p_; similar calculations can be made for B and R.
a
Let X denote the number of R's killed by B's per
engagement, during which period pDB shots by B take place.a
Again use the representation
K_ = Jl, + l n + .. . + I. + . .. £_ (2.10R 1 2 j R
where
!1





E[K_] = I E[l.] = RE[£.] = R« PU. =1} (2.12)R j=l 3 1 ^






Follow these steps to compute the expectation:
(A) The probability that i of the B's target on a
particular (the jth) R is given by the binomial
B -, i -, B-i
(i) Cr) U-r) / i = 0,1,.. .,B (2.13)
(B) Given that a B is targetted on the jth R, the
probability of at least one killing event (a kill) in a time




Consequently the probability of at least one killing event (kill)






= 1- Z (2.14)
where z may be interpreted as the probability of no kill (survival)
per engagement with one B.
(C) Now remove the condition on the number of B's:
PUj=l} = f (i-zM-MlUi-^
i=0
B-i





EU.] = PU.=1} = l-{l-| 1- (1-p PB 5
RB'
B




-M p 6-n Bi-' 1^' J} (2.16)
the expected number of R' s killed by B's in an engagement of
duration 6. This expression generalizes (2.4) to account for
less than unit kill probability and also allows the fire rate
J
B
to be specified. It continues to assume that all R's are
equally susceptible to B targetting, i.e. that there is no
coordination. Note that this does not necessarily represent
minimum coordination, for it might well be that the R's could
arrange for most or all B's to target only members of a very
small subset of the R's
—
perhaps made up of valueless decoys.
The tools for evaluating such a capability are at hand. See
Section 3 of this report.
Next assess the advantage of coordination by B when
opposing R. It is worth remarking that coordination here
means that B shots are shared as equally as possible across
R's. This tactic seems sensible as long as p..^ is high and
a reasonable number of shots can be gotten off. Otherwise, a
deliberate "gang up" tactic might be worth-while, and could be
evaluated.
Q
(a) — = 3 (constant) ; B,R + °° .
Without coordination we have for fixed 6 the expression













for | = 6 > 1 ;
(2.17)
the latter, second, formula assumes that (B/R=3) B's are allocat
to each R during 6. This may be called an even distribution
coordination tactic. The latter, first, formula assumes allocation
of one B per R as long as they last. Some R's are left
unattended.
It follows that when both B and R -* °° (both forces are










PB 6 'l-exp{-S[l- d-pRB ) ]>
PR 5S
< 1 -< 1
-Prb ) }
PR 5 '
l-exp{-6[l- (1-PRB ) ]>
5 B < 1
(2.18)
3 > 1
It is important to note that we are assuming no opportunity to
check for the effect of a shot during time 6 and change aim
point if successful, so no advantage is shown for rapid fire
rate, high kill probability and re-direction. It is assumed that
at the beginning of the engagement interval 6 each available
target is acquired.
It is tempting to compare the above models for attrition
with and without coordination when the engagement length, 8,
becomes small. Unfortunately the present models give indistin-
guishable results in this limit.
(b) B, R fixed, engagement time 6 * .
To study attrition of R's without B coordination rewrite
(2.16) and expand in power series:





-R[l-{l-i[l-. RB B ]}
l-|l+|^n(l-pRB )pB 6 + o(6) }= R
B-,
-n B
-r[i-{i + | £n(l-pRB )pB 6}_




With coordination we may use (2.17); expanding in power series
we get precisely the result (2.19). Another, halfway, approach
to coordination would be to split the R's into k disjoint
subgroups of size R/k each, and then assign B/k of the B's
to each group. Let K ,, denote the attrition in the generic
subgroup. Then total expected attrition is
E[kK
R/k ] = (k).| -{>-jR/kL1 " (1 "PRB ) B
pD 5-nB/k
(2.20




-B £n(l-PRB )pB 5 +o(5) . (2.21)
The conclusion is that in the limit the present model does not
reflect the advantage of coordination over a short time interval.
Note that the present simple model contains no explicit
agent for gathering and disseminating command and control infor-
3
mation. Some recognition of the cost of C can be introduced
by depleting the firing rate (in this case of R) of the coordinated
side to account for time spent in C activity. But more explicit
models are apt to be more informative; some are under development.
2.6. The Number of R Killed in a Single Engagement; A
Recursion Approach
It may be of interest to describe an alternative approach
to representing the attrition of R's by B's (and vice versa)
.
Think of B's being assigned sequentially to the R's so that
KR (j) is the number of R's killed after exactly j B's have
fired their salvos in an uncoordinated manner. Then notice that
12
A simple recursion (Markov chain) describes the situation
KR (J-1>U
KR (j) = KR (j-l) +
1 with probability 1-





The argument is that the number of killed R's increases by one
on the addition of the jth B salvo if and only if (i) the j th




according to equal likelihood) and (ii) the jth B's salvo
PB
6
results in at least one killing hit (probability z = 1 - (l-pRB ) )
Notice that (2.22) shows that {K_.(j)} is a Markov chain, and
that the representation can be used to easily simulate R attrition
for any number of B's. Of course the same procedure can be used
to generate or simulate B attrition.
Take expectations to re-derive (2.16):















Start with j = 2; E[K_(1)] = z, and recurrence providesR
E[K
R (j)] = R
-vB
-{-§} (2.24)
which is precisely (2.16).
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The representation (2.22) allows the derivation of a
recursion for the variance of K (j). Begin by squaring (2.2 ):
2K_(j-l) +1 with probability
KR (j)








E[KR (j)|K (j-1)] = K^(j-l) + (2Kp (j-l)+l)











Now remove the conditions to find
E[K
R (j) ]




R (j-l) ] + z 2-|E[KR (j-l)] (2.27)
Of course the variance is simply
[KD (j)] = E[k£(j)] - (E[KR (j)])
2
.R (2.28)
.2 , .One can compute E[K (j)] recursively from (2.27), knowing the
formula (2.24) or using (2.23). A closed-form expression can be
obtained if desired, but we skip this exercise for the result
will be very complex. Very likely KR (B) , suitably normalized
is normally distributed (Gaussian) for large R and B. See
Gaver and Powell (1971) for a similar application of occupancy
models that invokes alternative approaches.
2.7. A Dynamic Attrition Model for Assessing the Value of
Coordination
It is tempting to write down Lanchester-type attrition
models to represent the course of combat between two opposed
14
forces when one side coordinates and the other does not. The
expressions for E[K_] (and E[K_] already derived can be used
for this, at least in a rough preliminary way.
The attrition equations will be developed in discrete
time, with units of time advance taken to be 5=1. Imagine
that initially B's force size is B, and R's is R, and
let R(t) and B(t) represent force sizes after t engagements
or interchanges. Assume that B is uncoordinated in its engage-
ment with R, but R is coordinated against B . Our present
model treats combat as a sequence of individual engagements with
deterministic outcomes. Here are the equations:













B(t+1) = B(t) - R(t) 1- (l-pno )t- 'BR'




if R(t) < B(t) .
However,
B(t+1) = B(t) -B(t)






if R(t) > B(t) .
These equations, together with the initial conditions R(0) = R,
B(0) = B can be used to generate the entire deterministic history
15
of a combat. Suitably modified, they can generate a stochastic
realization or simulation. Numerical illustrations follow.
Notice that there would be no difficulty with making PBR / PRB
or even p_, and p_ depend upon the time, t.
2.8. Numerical Examples of Dynamic Attrition
The simple discrete-time Lanchesterian equations (2.29),
(2.30), and (2.31) are exceptionally easy to solve on a com-
puter. A program has been written to do so, and is available
on the NPS system via interactive terminal. We report a few
isolated experiments to show the effects of coordination.
Begin with





Here the two sides are evenly matched from a physical
viewpoint, but B is Uncoordinated in fire against B, while








where rounding* is to the nearest integer. Clearly the battle
goes decisively to the Coordinated combatant, and quickly so:
Case II: Again PRB
=























R(t) B(t) R(t) B(t)
20 23 20 25
11 13 11 15
6 7+ 5 10
3 4 2 7
2 3 0* 6
0* 2
Table 3
Note that in the present hypothetical situation B needs an
advantage of 3 to win, and the battle is much prolonged. The
situation is probably unrealistic in that the model suggests
very heavy attrition in the first interchange. But this effect
must be largely attributable to the assumed very high kill proba-
bility levels. Here, by way of contrast, is
Case III: Prb = pBr
= °* 2
PR
= pB = 1
17
















R(t) B(t) R(t) B(t) R(t) B(t)
20 20 20 21 20 22
16 14 16 17 16 18









7 7 6 9
6 6 5 7
5 5 3 7
4 4 2 6
3 3 1 5








Note that in this case of lower kill probability B needs only
advantage of 2 to win, so that coordination has smaller leverage.
Of course the above analysis is entirely deterministic,
and a careful stochastic-model analysis might well add further
insights. As it turns out, the recursion relations (2 . 29)
-
(2 . 31) c
be converted to stochastic difference equations that can form
the basis for a stochastic simulation of mutual force attrition.
This idea will be investigated in future work.
32.9. Another Model Involving C Activity: Assignment
with Checking
We present another model that represents the problem of
targetting a finite force, B, upon another, R. The model and
18
methodology are slightly different from the previous approaches.
This time we conduct the calculations recursively, imagining the
B's to be allocated one at a time to the R*s.
Let X^fk) be the number of distinct R's targetted by
is.
B's after k of the B's have conducted targetting activities;
k = 1,2,..., B. Here targetting consists of (a) initial target
selection (at random) , and then (b) checking, and correction.
The idea of the second step is to avoid duplicate coverage (if
technically feasible) . The checking step is conducted with error,
3 3
and may be viewed as a C function: the more effective the C
,
the smaller will be the undesired duplicate coverage.
The first phase of targetting is initial target selection,
which is assumed to be done at random, in the sense that each R
unit has an equal chance of being present after this phase (the
kth) , whether or not it was before, that is regardless of whether
it has been targetted after k - 1 B's are assigned.
The second phase may be termed checking , and has a command-
control flavor: if at the targetting time it is possible to
detect the possibility that another B has already targetted
the particular R selected, then a switch is made to a previously
untargetted R. Let this sequence take place with probability
3
9. Then 6=1 represents full C coordination capacity, and
6=0 represents total absence of such capacity; 6=1-6
represents the probability of failure of checking. The present
model assumes that i_f duplication is discovered it can be avoided
with certainty. A second model avoids this assumption but turns
out to be rather unmanageable analytically, although a simulation
approach suggests itself.
19
(A) Random targetting with one recourse step.
The following recursive expression describes XR (k):
XR (k)
= XR (k-l) +
XR (k-l)
with probability R 9
X
R (k-l)
1 with probability 1 R 9
(k=l,2,3,...,I
(2.32)
so long as X (k) < R (obviously since X (0) =0, X (k) < k)
.
R R R
The idea is that if there are XT) (k-l) B's allocated to R's aftei
k - 1 targetting steps then the next step is unsuccessful in addinc
a new R if a) the kth random selection is of a designated target
XR (k-l)(probability = - ) , and b) the checking procedure is unsuc-
cessful (probability = 9) . Assumption of independence leads to
the first line of (2.32), and the complementary probability gives
the second line. Now take conditional expectations to find
E[X





E[XR (k) ] = E[XR (k-l) 1 +1"| E[XR (k-l)]











and hence by induction in (2.29)
E[XR (2) ] = 1 + 1
-










Thus if B R we have
E[X
R
(B) ] = 1-1-
^B
R (2.36)
and if 8 -»• or 9 -»• 1 to signify perfect ability to check
and switch, then the above expectation approaches B. If 6=1,
meaning that there is no coordination capability, we are back to
the original formula (2.4). We do not discuss the case B > R
for this model. With some added complication the effect of rate
of fire and hit probability may be introduced to account for
expected hits.
(B) Targetting with finite (geometric) recourse.
Suppose that a redundant targetting is detectable with
probability 9, independently from occasion to occasion. We
wish to calculate the probability that X_(k) -Xn (k-1) = 0,
i.e. the kth allocation is redundant. This happens if there are
n(n=l,2,...) random selections, each of which results in a
redundant selection, and each of which is finally undetected:






sum over mutually exclusive alternatives to obtain
Xp (k-1) r X ^ X (k-1) _
/ l--^(k-l)6 . This then replaces -E1-= inR M ' {* R v ' } " —c R
the recursive expression (2.32). But it seems next to impossible
to obtain further analytic information from this model, and so
it is hereby dropped from further discussion. Of course the
revised recursion may be utilized for simulation if desired.
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3. An "Over the Horizon Problem" with a Moderately Intelligent
Missile
3.1. The Problem
Suppose one is called upon to shoot a single missile at a
far-distant, "over-the-horizon" target. Moreover, there are apt
to be other targets of no value within the area of interest. These
false targets may well distract the missile, thus rendering it
useless. Some calculations will now be made that indicate the
chance of hitting (and killing) the target, as the latter depends
upon the number of surrounding targets, and— a new feature—the
ability of the missile to discriminate between false and true
(valuable) targets.
3.2. The Simplest Model
If a fixed number, N, of false targets are near the true
target in the area, and if the missile essentially picks one at
random (or with equal likelihood) then the probability of correct
attack is
(3.1)CA N + 1
Note that if there are t true targets in the area the probability
of a correct attack on one is
(3.2)CA N + t
under the same conditions
.
3.3. A Moderately Intelligent Missile
Suppose that a missile, or missile plus guidance from satel-
lite or another sensor system can be designed that has the following
23
discriminatory behavior: a potential target is shown to the
missile; if it is (a) false the missile does not attack it with
3, but (mistakenly) attacks it with probability 3 (3+8=1),
while if the target is (b) true or genuine, the missile mistakenly
disdains it with probability a, and correctly attacks it with
probability a. All of this is independent of the numbers of
times the missile has seen the particular target (the beast has
no memory) . How has discrimination of this rudimentary kind
improved the previous situation?
The missile may be thought of as picking a target at random
from the N + l present, and then deciding whether or not to
attack. On a given selection occasion the missile disdains the
target with probability
N = 1
8 + ^rr a (3.3)N + 1 M N + l
for either a false target occurs with probability N/(N+1) and
then is not attacked with probability 3 or a true target is
picked with probability 1/(N+1) and the decision is made not to
attack with probability a. Now at the end of n trials (looks
at targets) the missile has still not committed itself with
probability
N * 1 ' n
8 + *nrT a (3.4N+l w N+l
since the missile is indiscriminate in picking its next candidate
The probability of correct attack is the probability that the
missile has remained uncommitted for n = 0,1,2,... looks, but








.-7o4— = — (3.5)
, N s 1 - N + 1 N8 + a BJ ,a,1
" NTT e " NTT a N + (F)
It seems reasonable to name the ratio a/3 the discrimination
of the missile (or the system) , so (3.5) amounts to
p _ discrimination .-> fi *
CA N + discrimination
Now note that the discrimination is equivalent to a certain
effective number of true targets. For instance let
a
.
Prob {attack true target, given a true target}
S Prob {attack false target, given a false target}
have the value t, where t may be in the range [0/°°), but
should be in the range [1/°°) ; then
(3.7)CA t + N
which is entirely equivalent to (3.2). This equivalence only
works for the first shot, if more than one is contemplated. A
consideration of the problem of dispatching more than one missile
at a group of targets might involve some interesting coordination
options. This problem is dodged for the moment.
3.4. Variable Numbers of False Targets
The above problem can be generalized, and possibly made
more interesting and informative, by assuming that the number of
false targets (e.g. decoys) are variable. In fact, take the
plunge and assume that N is a random variable with probability
mass function
25
P{N = n} = p„ (n=0,l,2,. . .) . (3.8)n
Then it is legitimate to calculate the probability of correct
attack by considering P_A (N) in the formulas (3.1) , (3.2) and
(3.5) as being conditional probabilities, given the value of N,




L nTT pn *PCA
n=0
This calculation is very easily carried out in the case of no
discrimination: from (3.1) now
PCA
n=0
For example, let N be Poisson,
i^p.' <3 - 9 »
Pn
= e"P £ , (3.10)






p £- = y 1 n+1CA
nio n + 1 nl n=0 (n+1) '
'
= (e p -l) S__ = I (l-e" p ) . (3.11)
Another mathematical approach to this problem is through the
generating function of the distribution of false targets. It
26
turns out that integrating the generating function is the right
move. Let the generating function be




< z < 1 .





Pn = J Q H-TT Pn " PCA (3.12)




-p(l-z)p(z) = e (3.13)
so
-p (1-z) , -p
e
K dz = e pz e
" p (e p -l)
e dz =
1 - e-P (3.14)
as before. Other distributions can be handled in the same general
way.
Now try the same trick on the mathematically equivalent
(3.2). Some modifications are necessary; first scrutinize
prA - I
n=0 n + t
rn
(3.15)
Note that if we write
v n+t-1 t-1 , v








z az) pn - I
n=0 n + t ^n
(3.17)
and finally multiply by t the desired result follows:
PCA= fc
t-1 / ^
z p(z)dz . (3.18)
With luck this can be evaluated, or be found tabled. Otherwise,
it is back to numerical summation, as in (3.15).
Let us try this method on the Poisson distribution of false
targets with t = 2 (with either two true targets present, or a





= 2e" p { e
pZ
z dz







-p d fe P - n
= 2e j— = 2<dp L P
_
= \ [e" p -l + p] .
One can easily do t = 3,4,... in principle although actual
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